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Government Speech and the Publicly Employed
Attorney
Margaret Tarkington
I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded its
theory of government speech in such a way that constitutional free
speech rights are nullified merely by categorizing the speech as
“government speech.”1 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme
Court nullified the free speech rights of public employees vis-à-vis
their employers by applying the government speech doctrine to the
speech of public employees whenever they speak pursuant to their
official duties. The Court held that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties . . . the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”2
The incorporation of the government speech idea into the realm
of public employee speech was a new development. Before Garcetti,
the test created in Pickering v. Board of Education3 was used to
 Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School; Visiting Associate
Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. © 2011 Margaret Tarkington. I
would like to thank Helen L. Norton for her helpful comments and Carla Crandall for her
exceptional research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009)
(explaining that if the speech at issue is “a form of government speech,” it “is therefore not
subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause” (emphasis added)); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (noting that government speech is completely “exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny” (emphasis added)).
Notably, prior cases indicated that the Free Speech Clause prohibited viewpoint-based
restrictions even where government speech was at issue. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing constitutional question would arise if
Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to
drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 193 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
(“The case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in
such a way as to ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’ . . . We find no indication that
the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect.”
(quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
3. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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determine if a public employee could be punished by an employer
for her speech. The Pickering test balanced the free speech interests
of the speaker and recipients with the government employer’s
interest in an efficient and effective work environment.4 The Garcetti
rule is in stark contrast: There is no balancing of the interests—
courts examine neither the importance of the speech nor the lack of
disruption to the workplace. Rather, if the speech is made pursuant
to the public employee’s official duties, the Free Speech Clause is
inapplicable and provides no protection to the employee.
The rule in Garcetti and the government speech doctrine in
general have been examined and criticized as problematic from a
number of viewpoints.5 One aspect that has not received sufficient
4. See id. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”).
5. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463 (2007) (arguing that Garcetti was
incorrectly decided, but also arguing that Due Process may provide a solution); Ruben J.
Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for
Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 22 (2008) (arguing that statutes are
insufficient to protect whistleblowers and arguing, despite Garcetti, for a move to greater
constitutional protection for such speech); Risa L. Lieberwitz, Linking Professional Academic
Freedom, Free Speech, and Racial and Gender Equality, 53 LOY. L. REV. 165, 165 (2007)
(“address[ing] the potential impact of Garcetti on constitutional rights of public sector
faculty”); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 210 (2008)
(arguing that Garcetti “was not in the public’s best interest and refut[ing] arguments that
federal and state whistleblower laws and civil rights laws provide adequate protections for
public educators who expose questionable school practices”); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public
Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti is “unsound as a matter of First
Amendment policy” for multiple reasons, including “because it under-protects public
employee speech that is vital to self-government,” and because “it creates perverse incentives
for public employees to go public and for their employers to broaden job descriptions to
capture as much employee speech as possible”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee
Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J.
1, 4, 34 (2009) (noting that “[l]ower courts routinely apply [Garcetti] to dispose of the First
Amendment claims of a wide range of public employees punished for their on-the-job reports
of safety hazards, ethical improprieties, and other government misconduct,” and arguing that
the Garcetti rule should apply only to “the speech of public employees that [the government]
has specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in
origin and thus open to meaningful credibility and accountability checks by the public”);
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1202 (2006) (“Garcetti adopted a
prophylactic rule in a situation in which the individualized circumstances supporting rule-based
adjudication were missing.”); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 118 (2008) (“In the
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discussion, however, arises from the facts of Garcetti itself—namely,
the special problem of using the government speech doctrine where
the public employee is also an attorney.6
The facts of Garcetti itself demonstrate the problem with
applying the government speech doctrine to attorney speech.
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles
County.7 Ceballos was contacted by the defense about a potential
problem with a search warrant that was critical in a certain
prosecution. Ceballos made his own inquiry into the matter,
including talking with the affiant of the warrant, and concluded that
the warrant contained serious misrepresentations.8 He wrote a memo
to his superiors and recommended dismissal of the case, but his
superiors refused to dismiss it.9 He then gave the memorandum to
the defense (after redacting his conclusions as work product) and
testified at the suppression hearing.10 As a consequence of these
actions, Ceballos suffered adverse employment actions, including
reassignment, transfer, and denial of a promotion.11 As explained in
Justice Breyer’s dissent, Ceballos believed that the speech contained
in the memo “fell within the scope of his obligations under Brady v.
Maryland” and progeny “to learn of, to preserve, and to
name of managerial prerogative, federalism, and separation of powers, Garcetti has the effect of
making government less transparent, accountable, and responsive.”); Susan P. Stuart, Citizen
Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2008)
(calling Garcetti “perhaps one of the most extraordinarily ill-considered—and short-sighted—
opinions penned by the United States Supreme Court in recent years” and discussing the
“adverse impact” that Garcetti is having on teachers and school administrators). But see
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti properly “recognized a prerogative of
public employers to regulate duty-related speech of public employees in order to ensure that
these officials are accountable for the manner in which the offices that they hold discharge their
public duties”).
6. In its Summer 2007 issue, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Magazine included two
pieces briefly discussing Garcetti as applied to defense attorneys and prosecutors. See J. Vincent
Aprille II, Public Defenders, Official Duties, and the First Amendment, ABA CRIM. JUST. MAG.,
Summer 2007, at 5 (arguing that Garcetti should not be applied to public defenders because
of their unique role in the government employment structure and because they must be
independent of state control); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Professional Independence, ABA
CRIM. JUST. MAG., Summer 2007, at 4 (arguing that Garcetti highlights the inadequacy of
rules and standards of prosecutorial conduct and the need for prosecutors’ offices to encourage
conduct like that of Ceballos).
7. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413.
8. See id. at 413–14.
9. See id. at 414.
10. See id. at 442 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 415 (majority opinion).
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communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment
evidence.”12
Despite the fact that Ceballos’s speech may have been required
by the Constitution and rules of professional conduct to protect the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant (the Court did not
actually examine whether or not it was so required),13 and despite his
disclosure of potential government misconduct, the Supreme Court
held that his speech enjoyed no First Amendment protection
whatsoever.14 His employer could freely discipline him for his
speech.15 In so holding, the Court incorporated the rule from its
government speech cases—namely, that speech made by public
employees in the scope of their official duties is treated as the
government’s own speech and the First Amendment is inapplicable.
12. Id. at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. The dissent noted that Ceballos had argued that the memo “fell within the scope of
his obligations under Brady v. Maryland” and its progeny “to learn of, to preserve, and to
communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” Id. However,
the majority never even discussed the possible characterization of the memo as Brady material.
Such an omission is problematic because it creates an interpretation of the Garcetti majority
that, regardless of whether the memo was Brady material, there is no First Amendment
protection for it.
Lawrence Rosenthal argues that Ceballos’s speech did not qualify technically as
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. Rosenthal argues that “Ceballos learned of the
circumstantial evidence suggesting police perjury from the defense counsel and his inspection
of the area described in the warrant application, not as the result of any information in the
exclusive possession of the District Attorney or Sheriff’s office. Ceballos’s opinion about the
affiant’s veracity similarly was not exculpatory information; he had no special ability to evaluate
the evidence.” See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 56–57 (emphasis added).
Rosenthal may ultimately be “right” that a court could determine that the memo was
not Brady material; yet, as noted, the Supreme Court’s decision does not appear to turn on
such a distinction. Indeed, the Court did not decide whether or not Ceballos’s memo was
within or outside the confines of Brady. The possible Brady characterization of the material is
raised by the Garcetti dissent, see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but
never even mentioned by the majority. The Garcetti Court’s conclusion that Ceballos’s speech
was denied constitutional protection appears to be based entirely on the fact that the speech
was made within the scope of his official prosecutorial duties, and not because it fell outside
the requirements of Brady. Moreover, the Garcetti case was decided on a motion for summary
judgment, which means that all evidence and inferences had to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the losing party—namely, Ceballos. Id. at 442 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Finally, in addition to viewing the premises and the circumstantial evidence raised by the
defense, Ceballos, as a member of the prosecution, talked twice with the police affiant for the
warrant about the contents of the affidavit to determine if there was any satisfactory
explanation for the discrepancies. See id. at 414 (majority opinion). Such information perhaps
was “in the exclusive possession of the District Attorney or Sheriff’s office.” Rosenthal, supra
note 5, at 57.
14. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22.
15. See id.
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As Helen Norton has summarized, in Garcetti, “the majority created
a bright-line rule that treats public employees’ speech delivered
pursuant to their official duties as the government’s own speech—
that is, speech that the government has bought with a salary and thus
may control free from First Amendment scrutiny.”16
While the Garcetti rule may be problematic for a number of
reasons, it is particularly troubling as applied to publicly employed
attorney speech. Attorney speech (including the speech of publicly
employed attorneys) is not government speech and should not be
treated as government speech. In examining this problem, it is
important to note that a primary contingent of publicly employed
attorneys is employed in the criminal justice system as either
prosecutors or criminal defense attorneys. It is within this criminal
setting that I will examine the Garcetti rule.
As discussed in Part II, a major premise of the government
speech doctrine—allowing the government to make expressive
choices—does not apply to criminal process. Compliance with the
Constitution (or not) upon prosecution of an individual is not an
“expressive choice” left to government discretion. Moreover, as
shown in Part III, the primary justification underlying the
government speech doctrine—the idea of political accountability—
does not exist for discipline imposed on the publicly employed
attorney. Importantly, political accountability is both insufficient and
inadequate to protect the constitutional interests at stake.
Indeed, the content of the “government message” is dictated by
the Constitution and the role of attorneys in our system of justice,
which will be explored in Part IV. Finally, as discussed in Part V, the
scope of government control inherent in the theory and practice of
the government speech doctrine is at odds and interferes with the
core function of the publicly employed attorney.
II. PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS NOT AN EXPRESSIVE
CHOICE
It is hard to even wrap one’s head around the idea of attorney
speech in the criminal process being “government speech”—
meaning a message that the government has decided as a matter of
policy to promote. On a very simplistic level such speech might be
categorized as government speech because (1) the government pays
16. Norton, supra note 5, at 12.
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the salaries of the prosecution and often the defense as well, and
consequently, (2) what is said by them is funded and thus owned by
the government and can be (and, within certain boundaries, is)
shaped by government policies. Unfortunately, this simplistic view
does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, a review of the government
speech cases illustrates how tortuous it is to fit publicly-employed
attorney speech into the government speech doctrine.
Rust v. Sullivan is one of the defining opinions for the
government speech doctrine. In Rust, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services implemented regulations that forbade recipients of
Title X funding from any activities that “encourage, promote or
advocate abortion as a method of family planning.”17 Indeed, the
regulations prohibited doctors receiving Title X funding from
counseling regarding abortion or referring a woman to an abortion
provider.18 The Supreme Court upheld the regulations, explaining:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity
to the exclusion of the other.19

Because the government has the option of not funding the program
at all, it can choose how to shape it. As the Court elaborated, “when
the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it
is entitled to define the limits of that program.”20 Similarly, in
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the government chose to
promote beef through an assessment on cattle sales, including
creating the ads, “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.”21 As with Rust, the
theory underlying the Johanns decision is that the government has
the option to fund a program (or not), and thus can define the
content thereof.22 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,23 the Court
17. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 193.
20. Id. at 194.
21. 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005).
22. See id. at 559 (“We have generally assumed . . . that compelled funding of
government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”).
23. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
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examined governmental placement of privately donated monuments
in public parks, and determined that such constituted government
speech. The Court explained: “The Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate
government speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for
itself.’ ‘[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views that
it wants to express.”24 Thus the government speech cases generally
involve areas where the government seems to have expressive choice
in using public funds—indeed, it need not fund the item or program
at all. The government can decide either to put monuments in parks
or to not have monuments in parks. The government can fund
women’s healthcare through Title X or not. It can promote beef—or
chicken or bacon or veganism. And if taxpayers disagree with any of
these expressive choices, they don’t have a First Amendment right to
receive a different message; rather, as discussed more fully below,
citizens can employ political accountability by voting those public
officials out of office.25
In stark contrast, the criminal justice system is not an “expressive
choice” belonging to the government. Theoretically, state and
federal governments could choose not to prosecute anyone, but once
they choose to prosecute someone, they lose in large part the ability
to choose what “message” to promote. The government is exerting
power to deprive people of life, liberty, and/or property. The
Constitution requires that such deprivations be handled with specific
guarantees in place; indeed, the Constitution makes several express
guarantees specific to criminal prosecutions.26 The Constitution does
not give the government an “expressive choice” of whether or not to
comply with constitutionally required criminal processes.
Granted, prosecutors have some expressive choice, generally
referred to as prosecutorial discretion, as to whether or not to
prosecute certain crimes. What prosecutorial discretion does not
include, however, is discretion to disregard the Constitution once a
decision to prosecute is made. Using Garcetti as an example, the
Constitution precludes the government from having the expressive
choice of failing to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense.27
24. Id. at 1131 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of
government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV, § 1.
27. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the
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Government has even less “expressive choice” for the publicly
employed defense attorney. The Constitution requires that the
government provide adequate representation for defense, which
includes providing to the criminal defendant an independent
attorney.28 Government does not have the expressive choice to fail to
provide counsel to criminal defendants where the Constitution
requires it.29
Moreover, in a number of the government speech cases, the
Supreme Court has emphasized the option of an alternative forum
for citizens to express a contrary message.30 Rust v. Sullivan is
illustrative. The doctors in Rust were not prohibited from promoting
and recommending abortions outside of their work at a Title X
project31 and were not required to work in clinics funded by Title
X.32 The Court emphasized that doctors could fund their own clinics
that recommended abortion if they disagreed with the government’s
message. By extension, as related to National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley,33 private individuals can fund art that the national
government fails to fund; and, as to Summum, individuals can fund
and promote their own private monuments and parks.
The criminal justice system is not even in this realm; there simply
is no private speech or non-government alternative. The subordinate
prosecutor who wants to comply with the Constitution against his
supervisor’s wishes cannot prosecute an individual in a different
forum, and the criminal defendant cannot choose to be prosecuted
in another forum where constitutional processes are closely attended.
To talk of an alternate forum separate from government funding
where the citizens involved (here the attorneys and the defendant)
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process . . . .”).
28. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–24 (1981).
29. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
30. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 n.5 (1991); FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (explaining that “a statutory mechanism” that
would allow broadcasters to engage in the prohibited speech when using non-federal funds
“would plainly be valid”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
545–48 (1983).
31. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (explaining that doctors working in a Title X project “can
continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion
advocacy,” but they must “conduct those activities through programs that are separate and
independent from the project that receives Title X funds”).
32. See id. at 199 n.5 (explaining that recipients are “in no way compelled to operate a
Title X project; to avoid the force of the regulations, [they] can decline the subsidy” and can
“financ[e] their own unsubsidized program”).
33. 524 U.S. 569 (1997).
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can promote their desired message doesn’t even make sense. The
only available forum for expression is the underlying prosecution,
with constitutional process as the government’s only option. The
government employs the judge, the prosecution, and often the
defense counsel. There simply is not a non-government-funded
forum where alternate speech can serve a meaningful role or can
adequately affect the government’s assertion of power over the
defendant.
While the government can fund art or beef or monuments as it
pleases, the criminal justice system is not a case of government
“say[ing] what it wishes.”34 Rather, it is coercive government power
being exerted against specific individuals, which brings into play
constitutional limits. Such use of government power is not an
“expressive choice”: It is the deprivation of life, liberty, and/or
property and must include the appropriate protections thereof.
III. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The major justification underlying the Supreme Court’s theory
of government speech is the idea of political accountability. As the
Court explained: “When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy.”35 Consequently, “[i]f the citizenry objects, newly elected
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”36 If
people don’t like the government’s message or funding choices, they
can fix this problem via democratic correctives—primarily by voting
34. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
35. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.
Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that
observers will associate permanent displays with the governmental property owner, that the
government will be able to avoid political accountability for the views that it endorses or expresses
through this means.” (emphasis added)); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563 (majority opinion)
(explaining that “[s]ome of our cases have justified compelled funding of government speech
by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic accountability,” and finding
that sufficient accountability existed).
36. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (noting that “[i]f the citizenry objects [to the manner
in which the government promotes its own policies], newly elected officials later could espouse
some different or contrary position”).
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their government speakers out of office. As summarized by Helen
Norton: “Political accountability, rather than the Free Speech
Clause, provides the recourse for those unhappy with their
government’s expressive choices.”37
As Norton persuasively argues, in order for political
accountability to work, there must be transparency and the
government must actually articulate its message.38 Indeed, as is
apparent from cases such as Johanns and Summum, the Supreme
Court has failed to ensure either transparency or articulation. The
majority in Johanns insisted that there would be political
accountability for the beef promotion ads because citizens who
objected to governmental promotion of beef could employ
democratic correctives and remove the beef promoters from office.39
Yet, as countered by the dissent, in upholding the Beef Act, the
majority “fail[ed] to require the government to show its hand.”40
The dissent noted that when the ad says “funded by America’s beef
producers” that “all but ensures that no one reading them will
suspect that the message comes from the National Government.”41
Political accountability is thus completely lacking. Since the public
will think the speech comes from independent beef sellers, it lacks
the knowledge to lay blame at the government’s door if it objects to
the message or to the use of public funds. The public will not
employ democratic correctives, not because the democratic
correctives don’t exist or because the public approves the message,
but because the public doesn’t realize that it is the government that
is providing the speech at issue.
Notably, in Summum, both majority and concurring opinions
seem to agree that there is political accountability for a statue placed
in a public park.42 If people don’t like it, they will know that the
message comes from the government and will elect different
representatives. However, the problem in Summum is that the Court
does not require that the government articulate its message. Instead
37. Norton, supra note 5, at 22.
38. See id. at 27–32.
39. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563–64.
40. Id. at 572 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 577.
41. Id. at 577.
42. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009); see also id. at 1139
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that observers will associate
permanent displays with the governmental property owner, that the government will be able to
avoid political accountability for the views that it endorses or expresses through this means.”).
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the Court says that a statue could mean one thing to one group and
something different to someone else.43 The Summum Court
illustrates this by discussing the “message” of a mosaic in Central
Park featuring the word “Imagine” in memory of John Lennon.44
Indeed, the Court presumes that the government is promoting a
constitutionally permissible message without any real examination of
the content of that message and without requiring the government
to articulate its message.45 Perhaps it could be argued that
articulation is a superfluous step because the government could likely
come up with a permissible message. Yet, failing to require
government to take that step means that government does not even
have to examine or be cautious regarding its messages.
Consequently, the Court allows government to avoid accountability
by permitting it to conceal (and not even undertake self-examination
regarding) the content of the message it promotes.
The problems with political accountability justifying the lack of
recourse to the Free Speech Clause exist in several government
speech cases (as Johanns and Summum illustrate), yet they are
particularly acute in the area of speech by publicly employed
attorneys.
First, while transparency may not be an issue in the criminal
process context (perhaps there is no clearer instance of government
providing a person with a message than by prosecution), articulation
is certainly a problem. Notably, as in Summum, the Garcetti Court
did not require the prosecutor’s office to articulate its message nor
did the Court examine the government’s message closely. What is
the message the prosecutor’s office was promoting by punishing
Ceballos for writing a memo exposing potential police perjury and
attempting to provide a criminal defendant with exculpatory
evidence? They certainly were not promoting a message of careful
compliance with constitutional processes and ethical obligations.46
43. Id. at 1135–36.
44. Id. at 1135 & n.2 (“What, for example, is ‘the message’ of the Greco-Roman
mosaic of the word ‘Imagine’ that was donated to New York City’s Central Park in memory of
John Lennon. Some observers may ‘imagine’ the musical contributions that John Lennon
would have made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the lyrics of the Lennon song
that obviously inspired the mosaic and may ‘imagine’ a world without religion, countries,
possessions, greed, or hunger.”).
45. See id. at 1135–37.
46. Rosenthal argues that the Constitution does not guarantee to “an accused . . . an
advocate inside of the prosecutor’s office who will protect the accused’s rights.” Rosenthal,
supra note 5, at 45. However, Rosenthal contends that professional ethics rules place a broader
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But as in Summum,47 the Garcetti Court just assumed that whatever
message was being promoted was acceptable because, under the
government speech doctrine, the government “is entitled to say what
it wishes.”48 But, again, even assuming that government can say
whatever it wishes, that does not undermine the importance of
articulation. If government were required to articulate the message it
was promoting (in order to protect itself from a Free Speech Clause
challenge), then it should also be required to show how the speech
or conduct at issue fits within that message. A prosecutor’s office has
the constitutionally and ethically dictated message of ensuring that
justice is done and that constitutional process is provided. If the
office cannot fit the challenged conduct (such as punishing a
subordinate for investigating and writing a memo about potential
exculpatory evidence) into its purported message, there is a problem.
Moreover, allowing the government to sidestep articulation
undercuts political accountability. Government can avoid democratic
correctives if government can promote a message without owning up
to it through articulation.
In addition to the articulation problem, political accountability is
wholly unworkable in the realm of criminal process, a primary
context for publicly employed attorneys. Political accountability is
both insufficient and inadequate to secure the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants whose life, liberty, and property are put into
the hands of publicly employed attorneys.
A. Political Accountability Is Insufficient to Secure Constitutional
Rights
With other types of government speech, it is at least plausible
that if there is transparency and articulation of the government
restriction on prosecutorial action and may require a prosecutor to actively protect the accused.
See id. Rosenthal’s theory of managerial prerogative would prohibit prosecutor offices from
punishing an employee “for honoring a constitutional obligation,” id. at 69, but would allow
(by denying First Amendment protection for) managerial policy and discipline that “violate
some state-law rule of professional ethics, but . . . no principle of constitutional law,” id. at 45.
Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith assert that “prosecutors are ethically obligated to
assure that the rights of their adversaries are protected.” See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 306 (3d ed. 2004).
47. 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
48. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
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message then political accountability may work. If a person does not
like the government’s expressive choices, she can push for the
speakers’ removal from office. Not so in the area of publicly
employed attorneys.
For example, what happens if a prosecutor’s office punishes an
attorney for trying to provide a criminal defendant with her
constitutionally guaranteed exculpatory evidence? It is near fanciful
that criminal defendants, demoted prosecutors, or even defense
attorneys will be able to successfully amass democratic correctives to
fix such constitutional deficiencies. Providing criminal defendants
constitutional process garners little public sympathy. In the words of
Erwin Chemerinsky: “Unpopular minorities—criminal defendants,
prisoners,
undocumented
immigrants—must
have
judicial
protection; there is no realistic chance that such individuals will
succeed in the majoritarian political process.”49 The lack of funding
for criminal defense is indicative of the lack of public sympathy and
concern for criminal defendants and for providing them with
constitutionally sufficient process.50 In fact, many criminal
defendants are disenfranchised and cannot even vote51—how they are
to bring about political accountability is a quandary.
Indeed, there is not only a lack of political accountability for
failing to comply with the Constitution in criminal processes, but
also a tendency to reward government employees engaging in such
constitutionally unnacceptable behavior. Studies indicate that
49. Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United
States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 61–62 (2004).
50. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 92 (1999) (“Providing genuinely
adequate counsel for poor defendants would require a substantial infusion of money, and
indigent defense is the last thing the populace will voluntarily direct its tax dollars to fund.”);
Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 427, 430 (2009) (noting that “state legislatures have been on notice,
sometimes for decades, regarding their state’s own indigent defense crises without taking
action” and noting that the people in “the general electorate often demand that politicians
take a ‘tough on crime’ stance,” which results in legislatures being “unresponsive to the
unpopular and largely silent constituency of criminal defendants”); Eve Brensike Primus,
Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 679, 699 (2007) (noting that despite the problems with indigent defense
funding “there is little reason to believe that local, state, or federal legislatures will choose to
contribute sufficient funds to solve the problem ex ante”).
51. Drinan, supra note 50, at 430 (“People accused of crimes are often excluded from
the electorate because they tend to hail from poor and alienated groups, or have even been
barred from voting if convicted of a felony.”); Primus, supra note 50, at 698–99 (“[S]ociety
disenfranchises most convicts, and the public is not exactly clamoring for greater safeguards for
criminal defendants”).
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prosecutors are promoted and obtain office based on their conviction
rate—not by complying with the Constitution or professional
responsibility obligations, or by uncovering police or other
governmental misconduct. As summarized by Erik Luna, “front-line
prosecutors are evaluated for promotion (and thus higher salary and
prestige) by their win-loss record, while chief prosecutors will be
reelected or retained based on, inter alia, the rate and number of
convictions obtained by their office.”52 Luna notes that dismissals
and acquittals “may affirmatively damage their careers regardless of
whether justice was done in the respective cases, including those
involving credible claims of actual innocence.”53 Erwin Chemerinsky
interviewed prosecutors across the country, including in Los
Angeles, and summarized:
Repeatedly, I heard from Assistant District Attorneys that they felt
that they were evaluated based on their effectiveness in processing
cases and gaining convictions. There were no incentives for
uncovering police misconduct or for dismissing cases because of
their suspicions about the police officers’ actions. . . . Such a
promotion and award structure maximizes the incentive for
prosecutors to disregard problems with police credibility that may
undercut the strength of the prosecutor’s case.54

The facts of Garcetti itself supply a ready example of actual dynamics
in a prosecutor’s office. Ceballos attempted to fulfill his
constitutionally required duties to a criminal defendant and suffered
adverse employment actions as a consequence. He was punished, not
rewarded.
Public support tends to clamor around “tough on crime”
candidates. Indeed, studies regarding judicial elections are shocking
on this score. One study examining hundreds of decisions from
elected judges in Pennsylvania found that “all judges, even the most
punitive, increase their sentences as reelection nears.”55 Another
52. Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1213 (2005).
53. Id. (emphasis added); see also Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It is Not
Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality
Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 293 (2001) (“Promotions for
subordinate prosecutors depend on their ‘scores’ for convictions. Winning gets rewarded while
misconduct [such as failing to comply with the Constitution] goes unpunished.”).
54. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons
of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 320–21 (2001).
55. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004), quoted in Amanda Frost
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recent empirical piece found “a strong relationship between election
years for judges and the likelihood that a defendant will receive a
death sentence. That is, conditional on being found guilty of
murder, criminal defendants were approximately 15% more likely to
be sentenced to death when the sentence was issued during the
judge’s election year.”56
Political accountability is also insufficient because criminal
defendants (even with the unlikely assumption that they could amass
majoritarian support) are unlikely to know about constitutional
violations absent protection of speech. That is, if the prosecution is
allowed to punish its employees for providing Brady material to a
defendant, this will deter subordinate prosecutors from undertaking
the speech in the first place or from suing when they are punished
for speech made to protect the rights of criminal defendants. Absent
protected speech from the subordinate prosecutor, the criminal
defendant will have no ready means to know of the violation.
Moreover, when the subordinate prosecutor can be punished for
conveying such information to the defense against the
recommendation of his supervisors (as that would fall within the
scope of his official duties and thus the Garcetti rule57), the
subordinate is chilled from informing the defendant at all.
B. Political Accountability Is Inadequate to Protect Constitutional
Process
Political accountability is particularly problematic because
constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants exist regardless of
the political makeup. Constitutional process for criminal defendants
should not depend on political accountability for implementation.
Indeed, that is why it is in the Constitution. Fair criminal process
was not left to the vagaries of political winds and majoritarian
& Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 737
(2010).
56. Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy
Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002).
57. Rosenthal argues against “a reading of Garcetti that would deny prosecutors
protection even when they speak pursuant to a constitutional obligation.” Rosenthal, supra
note 5, at 67. Although he notes that such a reading is possible, see id. at 68 n.120, he argues
that the “conception of employer prerogative does not deny protection for an employee who is
disciplined for honoring a constitutional obligation because an employer’s desire to suppress
such information is not within the scope of a public employer’s constitutionally legitimate
prerogatives,” see id. at 68.
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sympathies. As Amanda Frost and Stefanie Lindquist explained:
“Constitutionalism may be viewed as the antithesis of democracy
because the very existence of a constitution presumes that some
choices are to be withheld from the majority.”58 Thus there is an
inherent incongruence with incorporating the government speech
doctrine into speech protecting the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants: Political accountability—the cure for problematic
government speech—depends on the political climate, while
constitutional rights are supposed to exist regardless of the political
climate.
Further, for the criminal defendant who is deprived of
constitutional process and protections, ultimate political
accountability (removal from office) of the prosecutor does not cure
the deprivation. The remedy is inadequate. As noted above, it is
important to recognize that in the area of criminal prosecution and
defense, there is no alternate forum where the defendant or
prosecutor can vindicate constitutional rights or receive/provide
different treatment. If subordinate prosecutors are chilled or
punished for providing information to the defense, then the criminal
defendant will not even know about the deprivation and will be
unable to vindicate her constitutional rights at the time and place
where it matters to her as a defendant. The defendant is not going to
care if a prosecutor loses a subsequent election. Rather, the
defendant will care that she receives constitutional process, including
exculpatory evidence from the prosecution or dismissal of a case that
should not be prosecuted. The defendant will want the subordinate
prosecutor, like Ceballos, to be protected in providing speech that
fulfills that constitutional requirement. The defendant may be able to
avoid imprisonment or obtain a lesser sentence with such evidence.
That remedy is what matters to the defendant, and that remedy is
what the Constitution is intended to provide: justice.
IV. CONTENT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S MESSAGE
Another problem with the Garcetti rule and the treatment of
public employee speech as government speech is the consequent
content of the government’s message. Under the government speech
theory, when the government is giving and/or funding its “own

58. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 55, at 729.
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expressive conduct”59 or “its own policies,”60 then “it is entitled to say
what it wishes.”61 For example, in Rust, the government had created
the optional Title X funding.62 In so doing it could promote pro-life
policies, pro-choice policies, or neither. Indeed, it need not provide
any funding at all. In Johanns the government promoted beef—its
message: “Beef. It’s what’s for Dinner.”63 But it could have
promoted apple pie for dessert or yogurt for breakfast. Or
government could just stay out of the food-promotion business
altogether and promote none of it.
But the overall content of the message delivered by publicly
employed attorneys, again, in large part is not a policy choice. The
government’s message must be to do justice and comply with the
Constitution. The ABA Prosecution Function Standards state that
“[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice.”64 The comment
elaborates:
Although the prosecutor operates within the adversary system it is
fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to protect the
innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the
accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the
prosecutor has sometimes been described as a “minister of
justice” . . . .65

Although summarized here by the ABA, the content of the message
is not created by the ABA, but is dictated by the Constitution and its
promise of due process and special protections for criminal
defendants to ensure fairness and that justice be done.66 Thus, the
Garcetti Court mischaracterized the situation when it held that it
“simply” was allowing “the exercise of employer control over what
the employer itself has commissioned or created.”67 The Los Angeles
59. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (emphasis added).
60. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 575 (2005) (emphasis added)
(quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
61. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
62. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
63. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554.
64. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (1993).
65. Id. § 3-1.2 cmt.
66. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.
67. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
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prosecutor’s office didn’t “commission” Ceballos’s memo, and more
importantly, the office did not “create” his obligation to write it or
to provide the materials to the defense. If Ceballos’s memo fell
within his obligations under the Constitution, then the Constitution
created Ceballos’s obligation to write the memo, an obligation that
was also required by the applicable rules of professional conduct.
Publicly employed attorneys should be protected in making such
speech. It is not speech commissioned or created by their employers,
but is speech that is required by the Constitution and the rules of
professional conduct.
The fact that publicly employed attorneys represent both the
prosecution and defense underscores the deficiencies in the idea that
the government commissions or creates the message and should be
able to choose a side. As explained in the ABA Defense Function
Standards, “A Court properly constituted to hear a criminal case
must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and
jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel
for the accused.”68 Each of these three parties operates
independently from each other and is “essential to the fulfillment of
the court’s responsibility in the administration of criminal justice.”69
In contrast, the theory of government speech as articulated in
Rust is that by promoting one point of view (pro-life), “Government
has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”70 But, in the case
of the criminal justice system, the government is constitutionally
required to follow certain procedures and to create fair proceedings
that allow both sides to fully and fairly present their cases. Funding
the criminal justice system is not government’s “own expressive
conduct” that would allow government to employ what would
otherwise be a viewpoint discriminatorily favoring of one side “to the
exclusion of the other” side.71 The whole idea of the constitutional
constraints and requirements regarding criminal processes is that the
only message that government can promote is fair proceedings where
justice is done.

68. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-1.2 (1993).
69. Id. § 4-1.2 cmt.
70. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
71. See id.
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Because government always employs the prosecution, and often
employs the defense, it is helpful to examine the requisite content
that each side can constitutionally promote. For the prosecuting
attorney, the only message the government can promote is that
justice be done.72 A prosecutor represents a sovereign’s brute power
being brought to bear against an individual, and in so doing, the
prosecutor’s only interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.”73 As explained in the ABA Criminal Justice
Prosecution Function Standards, “this responsibility,” as exercised by
a minister of justice, “carries with it specific obligations to see that
the accused is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided
upon the basis of sufficient evidence, including consideration of
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution.”74 The message of
justice includes that the prosecution complies with the criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights. Importantly, contrary to Garcetti,
the government cannot “buy” employee speech75 and promote a
message of injustice in violation of the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants. The government simply lacks this “expressive
choice.”
Moreover, all prosecutors (subordinate or senior)76 have an
independent and personal obligation to promote justice, uphold the
Constitution, and abide by rules of professional conduct. When the
72. As noted in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, “A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice . . . .” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8
cmt. 1 (2006).
73. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added); see also
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 307 (quoting Berger); id. at 330 (discussing the
“prosecutor’s duty to ensure [a] fair trial for the accused,” which “reflects the prosecutor’s
duty to ‘seek justice’ rather than convictions”).
74. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3.11 cmt. (1993) (emphasis added).
75. Norton, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that Garcetti “treats public employees’ speech
delivered pursuant to their official duties as the government’s own speech—that is, speech that
the government has bought with a salary and thus may control free from First Amendment
scrutiny.”).
76. The Rules of Professional Conduct specifically make the performance of ethical
duties an individual responsibility that cannot be avoided by claiming that a supervisor directed
the conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (a) (2006) (“A lawyer is bound
by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of
another person.”). A subordinate lawyer, however, will not be found in violation of the rules if
she “acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty.” See id. at R. 5.2(b) (emphasis added). Notably, there is no
exception for violations of clear professional duties—both the subordinate and supervisory
lawyer will be in violation of the rule and subject to discipline.
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prosecutor was admitted to the bar, she took an oath to uphold the
Constitution and abide by the applicable rules of professional
conduct. Publicly employed attorneys should be granted speech
rights commensurate to such duties.
The constitutional role of the publicly employed defense attorney
is to provide a criminal defendant with effective and loyal assistance.
Such assistance cannot be controlled by the prosecuting government,
but must be independent therefrom.77 As the Supreme Court has
recognized: “[The defense attorney’s] principal responsibility is to
serve the undivided interests of his client. Indeed an indispensable
element of the effective performance of his responsibilities is the
ability to act independently of the Government and to oppose it in
adversary litigation.”78
Further, as explained by Freedman and Smith, the criminal
defendant’s right to counsel is “‘the most precious’ of [her] rights,
because it affects one’s ability to assert any other right.”79 Thus,
“[t]he right to competent counsel is central to every other right of the
criminally accused, and the denial of this right destroys the
foundation of adversarial justice.”80
It is hard to conceive of a way in which the speech of the defense
attorney on behalf of his criminal defendant client and in opposition
to the government could somehow be the government’s “own
expressive conduct”81 that entitles the government to control that
speech and “say what it wishes.”82 Even more so than with the
prosecution, the state cannot “buy” the public defender’s speech to
promote a message different from providing criminal defendants
constitutionally
sufficient—meaning
loyal,
effective,
and
77. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–22 (1981).
78. Id. at 319 n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204
(1979)); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 16 (explaining that the defense
“lawyer is not the agent or servant of the state,” but instead is “the client’s champion against a
hostile world” (internal citations omitted)).
79. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 46, at 13 (quoting United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984)).
80. See id. at 332 (emphasis added). Freedman and Smith explain that the American
“adversary system represents far more than a simple model for resolving disputes,” but has
been “constitutionalized by the framers” and “consists of a core of basic rights that recognize,
and protect, the dignity of the individual in a free society.” See id. at 13. Thus, “[a]n essential
function of the adversary system [] is to maintain a free society in which individual human
rights are central.” See id.
81. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
82. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
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independent—representation.83 The theory of the government
speech cases is entirely at odds with the idea of loyal and
independent representation of the criminal defendant.
Finally, and importantly, the publicly employed defense attorney
must be able to exercise independent professional judgment.84 In
Polk County v. Dodson, the Court noted the importance of the
independence of public defenders.85 The Court explained two ways
in which the public defender must be independent.86 First, public
defenders must be independent from superiors in their own office.87
The Court explained, “a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of
his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior,” in
part because the “public defender works under canons of
professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent
judgment on behalf of the client.”88 Indeed, Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(f)(2) forbids a third party from paying an
attorney for a representation unless “there is no interference with the
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship.”89 Thus, although public defenders are paid by a
third party for their representation—namely, their employer—to
provide representation to criminal defendants, the employer cannot
interfere with the attorney’s independence or the attorney-client
relationship. The public defender’s superiors cannot direct her
actions in the representation. The client is the criminal defendant
(even though the attorney is paid by someone else).
The Dodson Court additionally recognized “the constitutional
obligation of the State to respect the professional independence of
the public defenders whom it engages,” noting that an implicit
83. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 322 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))
(explaining that “[t]here can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an
effective and independent advocate”) (emphasis added).
84. J. Vincent Aprille II emphasizes the importance of this independence from the state
and loyalty to the criminal defendant in arguing that Garcetti should not apply to public
defenders. See Aprille, supra note 6, at 14. However, Aprille concludes by saying that Garcetti
does not apply to public defenders in that role because their speech is more akin to speech of a
citizen. See id. at 14–15. Nevertheless, while public defender speech is made on behalf of
private citizen criminal defendants, the public defender does not speak as a lay citizen. Indeed,
public defenders serve an essential role in the administration of justice, which is why their
speech must be protected.
85. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320–22.
86. Id. at 321–22.
87. Id. at 321.
88. Id.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2006).
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aspect of constitutionally sufficient defense counsel is “the
assumption that counsel will be free of state control.”90 Again, it is
impossible to square the idea of constitutionally sufficient, publicly
employed defense attorneys with the theory that the speech of such
public defenders should be treated as the government’s own speech
that can be dictated and shaped by the government.
V. SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER CONTROL
A final problem with fitting publicly employed attorney speech
into the theory of government speech is the scope of government
employer control shown in Garcetti. In Garcetti, the Court held that
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties . . . the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”91 The Court went on to define “official
duties” broadly, appearing to include employer control over all
responsibilities of the attorney.92 In applying the rule to Ceballos’s
speech, the Court opined that official duties (and the concomitant
lack of Free Speech Clause protection) included whenever the
attorney goes “about conducting his daily professional activities,
such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, . . . preparing
filings[, and] . . . writing a memo that addressed the proper
disposition of a pending criminal case.”93 Essentially, the Court
indicates that anything that is done within the scope of an attorney’s
responsibilities is government speech. “When he went to work and
performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a
government employee.”94 Unfortunately, the Court did not limit the
“tasks that [Ceballos] was paid to perform” to tasks that he was
specifically assigned to perform by his government supervisor. The
memo in question was written on Ceballos’s own initiative in an
attempt to preserve the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.
No one in the prosecutor’s office asked him to write it. Yet because
such speech was part of “conducting his daily professional
activities,”95 it was interpreted to be speech belonging to the
government and thus subject to government control and discipline.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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The broad scope of speech pulled into the government speech
doctrine interferes with the professional independence of publicly
employed lawyers. Rust again provides a contrasting example. In
Rust, the majority concluded that the regulations were permissible
because the doctors could additionally work in a clinic that was not
funded by Title X and provide abortion counseling in that setting96
or could opt out of Title X funding altogether and fund their own
clinic.97 Moreover, patients could be told that Title X simply did not
cover post-conception healthcare or counseling.98 Unlike the doctors
in Rust, prosecutors and public defenders cannot opt out of the
criminal justice system to provide a different “message” free from
their government employer’s control.
The broad scope of employer control is particularly problematic
for the criminal defense attorney. Again, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Polk County v. Dodson, “[A] defense lawyer is not, and
by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an
administrative superior.”99 As noted above, the Court recognized
that both the constitutionally dictated function and professional
responsibilities of the public defender do not allow for employer
control over public defenders.100 Rather, implicit in the criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel is “the assumption that
counsel will be free of state control” and “[t]here can be no fair trial
unless the accused receives the services of an effective and
independent advocate.”101 Under our criminal justice system, the
defense attorney’s role is not to “act[] on behalf of the State or in
concert with it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of
his client.’”102 Thus, “a public defender is not acting on behalf of the
State; he is the State’s adversary.”103 The publicly employed defense
96. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (“The Title X grantee can continue to
perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it
simply is required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate and
independent from the project that receives Title X funds.”).
97. Id. at 199 & n.5.
98. See id. at 200.
99. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981).
100. See id. at 321–22 (explaining that public defenders themselves “work[] under
canons of professional responsibility that mandate [their] exercise of independent judgment on
behalf of the client” and that the State has a “constitutional obligation . . . to respect the
professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages”).
101. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 318–19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)).
103. Id. at 322 n.13.
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attorney’s speech thus cannot be treated as government speech. Not
only is the government not “say[ing] what it wishes”104 when the
public employee speaks, but instead, the government is being
opposed and challenged by the public employee.
Even inside the public defender’s office, subordinate attorneys
have independent obligations to their clients that cannot be
controlled by their employer. Again, the Dodson Court explained:
The personal attorney-client relationship established between a
deputy [subordinate public defender] and a defendant is not one
that the [supervisor] public defender can control. The canons of
professional ethics require that the deputy be “his own man”
irrespective of advice or pressures from others. A deputy [subordinate]
public defender cannot in any realistic sense, in fulfillment of his
professional responsibilities, be a servant of the [supervisor] public
defender. He is, himself an independent officer.105

The Supreme Court has recognized the need for this
independence for lawyers even outside the criminal defense context.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held that the Free
Speech Clause prohibited Congress from restricting attorneys who
received federal funding from raising constitutional and validity
challenges to existing welfare laws.106 The Court recognized that
even though attorneys received congressional money, “[t]he lawyer
is not the government’s speaker,” but instead represents the interests
of her clients.107 Indeed, the Court recognized that “[t]he advice
from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to
the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a
generous understanding of the concept.”108 Admittedly, the
attorneys in Velazquez were not government employees, but instead,
recipients of federal funds that allowed them to provide
representation to the poor. But the Court in Velazquez recognized,
as it failed to do in Garcetti, the importance of the independence of
attorneys: “An informed, independent judiciary presumes an

104. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
105. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321 n.11 (quoting Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362,
1365 (D. Nev. 1974)).
106. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001).
107. Id. at 542.
108. Id. at 542–43.
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informed, independent bar.”109 Thus the Court held that Congress’s
attempt to limit the kinds of issues an attorney could raise with
federal funding was unconstitutional because it “prohibits speech
and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper
exercise of the judicial power. Congress cannot wrest the law from
the Constitution which is its source.”110 In like manner, the Court in
Garcetti should have clearly prohibited government employers from
punishing attorneys for complying with constitutional requirements
for criminal prosecution.111
Finally, both prosecutors and public defenders have individual
professional obligations to uphold the Constitution and to comply
with the rules of professional conduct. Indeed, they have sworn an
oath to do so. Regardless of what their employer decides should or
should not be done, where Constitutional rights and professional
obligations require that speech be made, the attorney’s speech
fulfilling that obligation should be protected from employer
discipline.112 Such protection is necessary to protect the underlying
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. As I have argued in
another context, if attorneys can be punished for speech made to
ensure or preserve the constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
then those rights are severely undercut and perhaps entirely lost.113
Part of the theory underlying the Garcetti rule and the
government speech doctrine is that the employee has no personal
interest in undertaking the speech when speech is made as an
employee (rather than “as a citizen”).114 The Garcetti Court found it
109. Id. at 545.
110. Id.
111. Although Rosenthal argues for an interpretation of Garcetti that would still prohibit
discipline for honoring a clear violation of Brady, he recognizes that the case can be read to
condone such discipline. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 68 n.120; see also supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
112. Rosenthal argues that the First Amendment should protect “an employee who is
disciplined for honoring a constitutional obligation,” but should not protect speech violating
“state-law rule of professional ethics.” See id. at 45, 68. Rosenthal contends that violation of
constitutional obligations is outside of employer prerogatives and thus should be outside of the
Garcetti rule, but that violation of state-law rules of professional ethics is within employer
prerogatives.
113. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 371–73 (2010).
114. Indeed, this was how the Garcetti majority interpreted Pickering v. Board of
Education. In Pickering, the Court had required a “balanc[ing] between the interests of the
teacher as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer.” 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added). The Garcetti Court,
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dispositive that Ceballos had written his memo “pursuant to his
duties as a calendar deputy.”115 The Court determined,
consequently, that:
Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what
he . . . was employed to do. It is immaterial whether he
experienced some personal gratification from writing the
memo . . . . The significant point is that the memo was written
pursuant to Ceballos’ [sic] official duties. Restricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.116

In other words, because Ceballos would not have written the memo
if he had merely been a private citizen and had not been employed as
a prosecutor (that is, the memo “owes its existence” to his work
duties), then he has not lost any First Amendment rights that he
would have enjoyed as a private citizen. The theory is that the public
employee has not “lost” anything by virtue of his public employment
when the speech that lacks protection is speech that the employee
would never have undertaken absent the employment.117 In a similar
vein, a concurrence of the Ninth Circuit opinion affirmed by
Garcetti had theorized: “[W]hen public employees speak in the
course of carrying out their routine, required employment

emphasizing “as a citizen,” determined that “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis added). However, prior
Supreme Court cases had applied the Pickering balancing approach even where speech was
made by an employee as an employee. See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
(finding Pickering’s balancing test applicable for speech made by Meyers “as an employee” for
the one portion of speech that regarded matters of public concern); Givhan v. W. Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (finding protection for public employee work-related
discussion with supervisor).
115. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
116. Id. at 421–22.
117. Id.; see also id. at 423–24 (“Employees who make public statements outside the
course of performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection
because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the
government. . . . When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities,
however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees.”).
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obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that
speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right.”118
The theory, however, is flawed, particularly in the context of the
government-employed attorney and the public employee providing
constitutionally required speech. First, in the context of a
prosecuting attorney fulfilling her duties under Brady v. Maryland,119
the government employer does not “commission or create” the
speech obligation. Rather, that obligation is created by the
Constitution itself. Second, a prosecuting attorney is not fulfilling
mere job duties imposed by her employer in so speaking. She not
only has a “personal interest” in undertaking the speech, but she has
personally sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution upon admission
to the bar. Whether or not her “employer” considers it a part of her
duties to investigate and provide the defense with Brady materials,
the attorney has sworn an oath that personally (as a citizen and a
lawyer) obligates her to speak. This personal obligation is not, as
mischaracterized by the Garcetti Court, merely a matter of
“experienc[ing] some personal gratification” in one’s speech.120
Rather, it is a serious and weighty personal obligation. Both the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Constitution require
investigation and provision of exculpatory evidence to the defense,
with a threat of professional discipline for failing to so do.121
Moreover, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not allow a
subordinate lawyer to avoid discipline for a clear violation of the
Rules by arguing that a supervising lawyer told him to act in that
manner.122 The obligation is personal, and attorneys need the
requisite speech rights to fulfill speech obligations imposed by the
Constitution and Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
Publicly employed attorneys play vital roles in our criminal justice
systems. Many aspects of those roles are dictated by the
118. See id. at 416 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d
1168, 1189 (2004) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)).
119. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
120. “It is immaterial whether he experienced some personal gratification from writing
the memo; his First Amendment rights do not depend on his job satisfaction.” Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 421.
121. See Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d)
(2006); see also ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS, 3-3.11 & cmt.
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2006).
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Constitution, and some are additionally required by rules of
professional conduct. To categorize attorney speech as government
speech, which can be shaped and controlled as government
employers please, frustrates the constitutional role that these
attorneys play in our system of justice.
Commentators have condemned Garcetti and argued for a return
to the Pickering standard for public employees.123 Pickering certainly
would be a vast improvement over Garcetti because the free speech
rights of the publicly employed attorney would have to be weighed
and thus recognized to some degree. But Garcetti highlights the
particular problems associated with protection and lack of protection
for attorney speech—an area that certainly has been insufficiently
explored and developed. Where the public employee is also an
attorney, rather than applying the governing case law covering free
speech for all public employee speech, special considerations should
be taken into account and perhaps a new methodology should be
employed. Attorney speech serves very specific functions essential to
our entire system of justice. These functions include the protection
of the constitutional rights of criminal and civil litigants and assisting
individuals in invoking and avoiding the power of government when
government seeks to deprive them of life, liberty, or property. In
light of the particular role that attorneys play in our constitutional
structure, attorney speech should enjoy special protection when it is
essential to the role of the attorney in the administration of justice
and in the protection of constitutional rights of litigants—especially
of criminal defendants.124

123. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 5.
124. I am currently working on a paper, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting
Attorney Speech, that proposes a theory and methodology for protecting such speech.
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